Monday, April 21, 2014
Five Easters without my daughters just hit me. If you are a parent of a divorce or custody "battle" think about your children. There shouldn't be battles over children. I can't get back the last five Easters with my little girls. Children are not ropes to be used for tug-of-war. Children should be shared and loved by both parents and their families. I have talked to many parents and I have yet to hear one story where the children have benefited from an unnecessary nasty custody battle. Don't be one of those parents. Don't give a judge an unnecessary reason to restrict parenting time. I wouldn't wish losing one's children on the people who took mine from me. If you have to carry hate for the other parent, do not let it bleed down to the children as it will only serve to breed more hate. Love and dignity are key ingredients to raising strong children. Be honest with yourself because your children will someday know the truth if they haven't already figured it out. Never underestimate the importance of the time your children need with the other parent. Evenings, days, and weekends add up to years. Then you blink and your children are adults. Cherish what little time you have with your kids. Be fair to your children raise them in a world with both parents.
Tuesday, March 25, 2014
Indiana Appellate Judge John G. Baker: "It was Judge Ezra H. Friedlander who filed the Anonymous Decision in Brewington Divorce Appeal."
Sometimes it’s hard to narrow a topic down for a blog post given there are so many complex disturbing facets to my case. One subject deserving attention is Indiana Appellate Court Judge Ezra H. Friedlander. Judge Friedlander has played a major role in both my criminal and divorce appeals. Friedlander’s actions in my case have also remained relatively anonymous, until now. Former Chief Judge of the Indiana Appellate Court John G. Baker was the person who brought this matter to the attention of my lawyer. What is truly scary about my current criminal case is if the Supreme Court upholds the verdicts in my criminal appeal, Judge Friedlander will be able to initiate criminal proceedings against me for criticizing him in this blog post.
Many people have had difficulties following all of the events in my divorce and criminal hearings, which is very understandable due to the complexity and also the absurdity of the entire situation. On August 18, 2009, Judge James D. Humphrey filed the Decree of Dissolution in my divorce, which abruptly terminated my parenting time with my 3 and 5 year old daughters pending a psychological evaluation. Humphrey’s decree also stated I had to pay my ex-wife over $122,000 for my future interest in farmland that my parents purchased over the course of a 28 year marriage. The property was placed in a trust prior to my father’s passing in 1998; a year before I met my ex-wife. I appealed Judge Humphrey’s ruling on the termination of parenting time and the inclusion of the trust assets as marital property in the divorce. In 2010, the Indiana Appellate Court upheld all of Humphrey’s findings. The Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer of my divorce case. What was most peculiar about my divorce appeal was the Court of Appeals ruled “Panel Per Curiam,” which means the Appellate Judge who authored the decision in my divorce appeal remained anonymous; until now.
When the Indiana Court of Appeals filed its opinion in my divorce case on July 20, 2010, I didn’t know what panel per curiam meant. I found a common consensus was that panel per curiam rulings were issued by judges looking to avoid conflict or criticism. After some research, I discovered my appeal was the only case in 2010 the Indiana Appellate Court ruled per curiam. It was only after the conviction in my criminal case that I found out the Appellate Court’s 2010 per curiam ruling in my divorce case was the first per curiam ruling in nearly 50 years. It wasn’t until January 2013 that I found out the author of the panel per curiam ruling in my divorce was Judge Ezra H. Friedlander. How did I find out? Former Chief Judge of the Appellate Court, John G. Baker told my lawyer. Judge Friedlander would not only sabotage my appeal of my divorce decree but would also later interfere with the appeal of my criminal conviction as well.
When Judge Friedlander issued the anonymous decision in my divorce appeal, he filed the ruling “Not for Publication” meaning the decision “shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court.” In layman’s terms, “not for publication” usually deals with cases involving already established case law, which was always mind boggling in my case because there were no cases prior to my divorce appeal that directly dealt with the issues at hand. My main complaint throughout the course of my divorce was Dr. Edward J. Connor never provided me with the case file that Dr. Connor relied upon to support his findings in the custody evaluation he performed in my divorce. Indiana Code (IC) 31-17-2-12 states a custody evaluator’s report may not be excluded as hearsay or otherwise incompetent if the following requirements are met:
(c) The investigator shall make the following available to counsel and to any party not represented by counsel:
(1) The investigator's file of underlying data and reports.
(2) Complete texts of diagnostic reports made to the investigator under subsection (b).
(3) The names and addresses of all persons whom the investigator has consulted.
(d) Any party to the proceeding may call the investigator and any person whom the investigator has consulted for cross-examination. A party to the proceeding may not waive the party's right of cross-examination before the hearing.
There’s been quite a bit written about Dr. Edward J. Connor’s inability to tell the truth, especially regarding my attempts to obtain Connor’s case file. When the issue regarding IC 31-17-2-12c was placed before Friedlander, Judge Friedlander wrote:
“We first note that I.C. § 31-17-2-12(c) does not require that Dr. Connor’s entire case file be provided to Daniel. All the items specified by statute were provided. Other than his belief that I.C. § 31-17-2-12(c) was violated, Daniel asserts no other basis on which to find that Dr. Connor’s report and testimony were inadmissible or should have been excluded from evidence.”
That’s it. That’s all Friedlander wrote. The first question one would ask is what does IC 31-17-2-12(c) require Dr. Connor to release? There hasn’t been any previous court rulings or legislation that further define the original legislative intent of IC 31-17-2-12(c). Someone not familiar with the case would just assume Judge Ezra Friedlander was aware of what Dr. Connor provided me and was content that the information was sufficient per IC 31-17-2-12(c). The problem is there was never any court record of what information Dr. Connor provided. There was no way to tell what portions of Dr. Connor’s file were required to be released under IC 31-17-2-12(c) without, at least, Judge Humphrey reviewing the contents of the file; which never occurred. How did Friedlander know I was provided with everything required by IC 31-17-2-12(c)? He didn’t. For whatever reason Friedlander did not want to deal with the issue and dismissed my entire legal argument with three sentences. It wasn’t until my criminal trial that I discovered Dr. Connor released information from Connor’s case file to Prosecutor Negangard that Connor failed to release to me during my divorce. But from a legal standpoint, this wasn’t the worst of Friedlander’s actions.
In August 2009, Judge Humphrey ruled I owed my ex-wife over $122,000 for what the court called a future vested interest in farmland my parents placed into a trust before the death of my father. This is where the situation gets very complicated/ridiculous. Humphrey did not rule that my ex-wife was entitled to my parents’ farmland; he just ruled that I was required to pay my ex-wife $122,000 for my future interest in the farmland. When my father was dying of cancer in 1998, he and mom placed their property in a trust that would provide for mom throughout her lifetime with any remaining assets falling to dad’s “legal issue” upon mom’s passing. Dad named his brother as the trustee of the trust and mom was the beneficiary. Humphrey’s ruling that I was to pay my ex-wife $122,000 was not contingent on the death of my mother, I was responsible for paying the $122,000 when the ruling was issued on August 18, 2009. Every banker and trust attorney gasped when they saw the ruling. Most were very confident the ruling would be overturned. Then Judge Friedlander came into play.
It is truly disturbing how a judge of a state appellate court would go out of his way to rule against a party petitioning the court. In my appellant brief, my lawyer directed the Court to review the case of Fiste v. Fiste when considering the matter of including a future interest in a trust as a marital asset. In regards to Fiste, Friedlander wrote:
“We determined in that case that because the husband had no present possessory interest in the land and because his interest was subject to complete defeasance if he predeceased his mother, his remainder interest in the real property was too remote to constitute marital property.”
It seemed exactly like my situation. If I died before mom, I wouldn’t be entitled to anything in the trust. Upon mom’s death, any assets that would have gone to me would pass to any of my children. But Friedlander said my case was different. Friedlander wrote:
“[Dan’s] interest is not subject to a condition subsequent and as such, his interest is not subject to complete defeasance should he predecease his mother. Per the terms of the trust, Daniel’s remainder interest will pass through him regardless of whether he predeceases his mother.”
Friedlander worked hard in his attempts to discredit the legal arguments in my appeal from my divorce case. The easiest way to discredit Friedlander’s reasoning is to look at my brother’s interest in the trust. If my brother died before the death of my mother, what happens to his share of the trust when mom passes? The answer is he doesn’t have a share; he’s dead. No assets pass through my brother’s estate. What would potentially have been his share would just become mine. Because I have children, if I were to predecease my mother, my share would fall to my children per the terms of the trust. If for some reason (I’m obviously using worst case scenario to demonstrate a point) my children and I predecease my mother, my “half” no longer exists and my brother gets everything upon mom’s death. It’s all rather morbid but there really isn’t another way to explain it more clearly. And even more ridiculous “what if” scenario is if my father happened to have another family or children to which we were not aware. Anyone bearing a birth certificate listing my dad as the father would also be entitled to an equal share of the trust.
But Friedlander claimed my case was different. Friedlander wrote my situation was similar to the case of Moyars v. Moyars where the court “likened a vested future interest in land to vested pension benefits.” Friedlander went on to write:
“As in Moyars, Daniel had no current possessory interest in the land, as his mother held a life estate therein. Daniel’s right to take legal possession of the land at some point in the future was fixed and certain.”
There are many troubling aspects with Friedlander’s logic. For one, Friedlander compared my interest in a trust to a man who was actually listed on the deed of a property. David Moyars and two other siblings were willed property upon the death of David’s father. He was on the title of the property which could be “sold or otherwise alienated, transferred or mortgaged.” David was not able to take full possession of the property until the death of his mother but he was listed as an owner of the property and it was subject to marital division. If David predeceased his mother Geneva, his interest in the property would go to his estate upon the death of Geneva. I, on the other hand, have no right to any assets in my father’s trust. Of course Friedlander failed to address how Judge Humphrey stated in the original ruling that I had a possessory interest which may be sold, transferred, or mortgaged. I had no control of the assets in my father’s trust because the trust specifically designates the Trustee as the only person with the authority to sell, transfer, or mortgage property within the trust. Friedlander relying on Moyars is even more flawed because the trial court would have been required to join all parties who had an interest in the property in question. In the Moyars decision, the Appellate Court wrote, “the trial court joined Geneva Moyars and David's two siblings in the dissolution proceeding as persons needed for a just adjudication.” Humphrey would have been required to join to the divorce proceedings as interested parties, the trust, trustee, beneficiary, and any other individuals with a future interest, which would include my uncle, mother, brother, children and me. In stretching to compare my case with Moyars, Friedlander ignored the requirement that all interested parties be added to the dissolution as was properly done in Moyars. A recent ruling by the Indiana Supreme Court concerning trusts further demonstrates the flaws in Friedlander’s ruling. The Court recently ruled in Fulp v. Gilliland that a trustee cannot serve two masters. The current responsibility of the trustee in my father’s trust is to provide for the beneficiary at the trustee’s discretion. I am not a beneficiary. My mother is the beneficiary. If the trustee believes it is necessary to dispose of all the assets of the trust to care for the beneficiary, then I get nothing. This is written plainly in the terms of the trust yet Friedlander stated my right to the property in the trust was “fixed and certain.” By Friedlander’s account, if a complete stranger assigned a future interest in property by means of a trust to someone involved in an Indiana divorce, the person’s spouse would only have to place a monetary value on the property in order to include the future interest as a marital asset. It would then become the responsibility of the poor soul who was unknowingly given the future interest to refute the value of the property. Not only would the person have to retain their own appraisal, but he would have to subpoena banking information, acquire tax information, research liens, etc., in order to refute the value of something he never agreed to take on. From a constitutional standpoint Friedlander’s ruling is deplorable because the ruling allows a third party (trust agreement) to place a financial burden on someone without giving the person the financial means to deal with that burden. A person can choose whether to work for an employer with a pension fund. A person who is willed property or money has the value of the acquired assets to defend against any claims. In a trust like the one in my divorce, a person has neither the right to refuse the obligation of the trust nor the ability to access the assets. Not only did I not have a right to the assets in the trust, Friedlander’s ruling made me financially liable for arguing the value of assets to which I had no claim.
Near the end of Friedlander’s ruling he wrote, “We commend the trial court for its thorough findings, each of which are supported by the record.” If Humphrey’s findings were so thorough, why did Friedlander have to go to such lengths to affirm Humphrey’s findings? And what record was Friedlander referring to? Friedlander’s opinion had the same common undertone as other legal officials with whom I have crossed paths in my experiences with the Indiana court system. Friedlander wrote:
“During the pendency of the proceedings, Daniel posted information concerning the dissolution on his website and blog, in response to which Melissa sought a protective order and a temporary restraining order on more than one occasion.”
I did post information about the events of my divorce on a blog and website and my ex-wife subsequently sought a protective order and temporary restraining order requesting Judge Humphrey to force me to remove my internet writings. My ex-wife did this once and Humphrey properly denied her petition because my web content was not harmful to her or my children. Friedlander simply made up the part about my ex-wife filing for protective orders on more than one occasion while ignoring the fact that her petition was properly denied. Friedlander chastised me for prevailing in a matter involving free speech where there was no evidence that the speech was harmful to my children. The major question is why did Friedlander write a “panel per curiam” decision? This is what seemed to bother Judge John Baker the most. All appellate rulings are required to have at least a panel of three judges. Given the obvious flaws in Friedlander’s ruling, it is hard to conceive that two other Judges from the Indiana Court of Appeals could review the record of my divorce and come to the same conclusion as Friedlander; especially as Friedlander’s decision is not supported by the facts of my divorce case or Indiana law. This might explain why someone with an IP address registered to the Indiana Supreme Court was visiting my website while Friedlander was writing my appeal. I believe Friedlander’s unilateral ruling on my divorce appeal and blatant disregard for proper appellate procedure is what most angered Judge John Baker. But my divorce appeal did not mark the end of Judge Ezra Friedlander’s involvement in my experiences with the high courts of the State of Indiana.
When I was first arrested in Dearborn County, Indiana, Judge Sally Blankenship set my bond at $500,000 surety and $100,000 cash based on the prosecution’s argument that I did not respect the Court and the prosecutor’s office and would probably continue writing about my case if I was released. Judge Brian Hill refused to lower my bond and refused to grant a bond between my conviction at trial and my sentencing hearing. Judge Hill then denied my motion for a bond pending the appeal of my case. When I took the matter to the Indiana Court of Appeals, my motion was denied. One of the Judges listed on the order denying Appellant’s Verified Motion for Bail Pending Appeal dated May 11, 2012, belonged to Judge Friedlander. There was no explanation why the Court denied the motion, just a flat denial. What findings did Friedlander rely on in discussing the denial of my motion for bail with Judges Crone and Sullivan; the other two judges on the panel? Did Crone and Sullivan review the motion or did Friedlander unilaterally rule on the matter as he did in my divorce appeal? Did Friedlander base his decision on the record of the case or did he rely on outside sources? Maybe Friedlander based his opinion on the fact he believed my ex-wife had to file for multiple protective orders even though it never happened. What we do know is Friedlander eventually decided he should not preside over the appeal of my criminal case because he felt there was a conflict because he wrote the decision in my divorce appeal. When did Friedlander withdraw? Less than a day before the oral arguments in my case were to begin.
Judge James D. Humphrey seemed to have this problem. Dearborn County Prosecutor F. Aaron Negangard, and later the Indiana Attorney General, argued Judge Humphrey feared Dan Brewington posed a real danger to the lives of Humphrey and his family in August 2009 and possibly earlier. Even though Humphrey claimed he thought I posed a real risk of murdering his family, he continued to preside over my case for nearly a year. (This subject never ceases to amaze me.) Humphrey waited until less than a week before the June 14, 2010 hearing on the approval of a mental health evaluator to recuse himself. Friedlander did the same thing. In an order from the Indiana Court of Appeals, dated August 21, 2012, the Court set the oral arguments in my case for 11:00 am on November 21, 2012. The order also set the panel to hear the case, which included Senior Judge Darden, Judge Brown, and Judge Friedlander. On the day of the hearing, the proceedings were delayed for approximately a half an hour. It was a couple months later in an informal setting that Judge Baker informed my appellate lawyer the delay in the hearing was due to a last minute search for judges to hear my case. Judge Baker claimed Judge Elaine B. Brown withdrew from my case because she feared for her own safety. Baker said Friedlander withdrew because Friedlander claimed ruling on my divorce created a conflict of interest. At the last minute, the Indiana Court of Appeals was scrambling to find judges to hear my case, finally settling on Judges Darden, Riley, and Baker. Friedlander presided over my bond appeal prior to May 11, 2012. On August 21, 2012 he was named a member of the three judge panel to hear oral arguments in my case on November 21, 2012. Rather than recuse himself immediately, Friedlander denied my ability to post bail and get out of prison during the appeal of my case and then waited until the last minute to withdraw, leaving the replacement judges unable to properly prepare to hear my case. (Note: I have no idea why my case would cause Judge Elaine Brown to fear for her personal safety. I assume she has handled many cases involving violent criminals, yet I guess her fear of bloggers is much greater.)
Dearborn County Prosecutor F. Aaron Negangard argued I was a threat to the United States Judicial System. I’m not a threat. Judges like Friedlander are a threat to the integrity of the judicial system; I just write about their conduct. If you back up through the whole story and claim Friedlander’s rulings were truly based on fact and law, the “Panel Per Curiam” fact still remains. Friedlander placed a question of doubt on the decision in my divorce appeal when he issued the first anonymous decision in nearly fifty years. Then Friedlander continued his involvement in my criminal case until removing himself just prior to the oral arguments in my criminal appeal. I have no idea why Judge Baker would tell my lawyer these things especially as Baker knows I went to prison for 2.5 years for criticizing the court system on the internet. I hope Judge Baker would expect a lawyer to share this type of information with the lawyer’s client because not doing so would be unethical. Blogging about judicial conduct is what landed me in prison but why should I suffer consequences for writing about the conduct of members of the Indiana Judiciary? I have a right to free speech, do I not? Maybe not in Indiana. If the Supreme Court upholds my convictions, then people will no longer be able to criticize the actions of judges in the State of Indiana without fear of prosecution.
Wednesday, March 12, 2014
This really appears to be one of those “here we go again” moments. I had a hard time coming up with a title for this post because this new ordeal is so mind-boggling. When I was incarcerated at Putnamville Correctional Facility, my Indiana criminal appellate lawyer began taking measures to help reunite me with my daughters. He found Dr. D. Mark Snelson, M.D., a psychiatrist from Indianapolis, and obtained prior approval from Judge Ted Todd that Snelson could evaluate me. (For those new to my story, in August 2009, Judge James D. Humphrey terminated my parenting time with my 3 and 5 year old daughters, until I underwent a psychological evaluation to determine I was not a potential danger to anyone. I underwent an evaluation in October 2009, but could not get a court date to have the evaluator approved until November 24, 2010; over a year later. Judge Todd denied that psychiatrist because he wasn’t pre-approved.) My lawyer checked around and came up with Dr. Snelson. Per the Court’s order, Snelson’s job was to determine if I posed a potential risk to my daughters, their mother, or myself so that I may then participate in supervised visitation with my girls under the supervision of another mental health provider. My lawyer and Snelson agreed that Snelson would meet with me in prison to expedite the process of being reunited with my daughters. I had my doubts about being evaluated by anyone in Indiana given my experiences with the Indiana Courts but I was talked into ignoring my “paranoia” and going ahead and meeting with Snelson. I mean, lightening couldn’t strike twice, could it? Bang.
Judge Humphrey terminated my parenting time for exactly what I am doing in this blog post. One lawyer advised me not to post this because it could be perceived as me attacking everyone I run across in the court system. As a reader, I ask you to decide if this is worthy of public criticism. Read the letter of Dr. D. Mark Snelson, dated February 12, 2014. Snelson met with me at Putnamville for 1 ½ hours on August 20, 2013. He then recommended I undergo a thorough psychological evaluation with psychologist Dr. “Chris.” (“Chris” is the first name of the psychologist. I was going to go with “Dr. C” but I did not want people to confuse the psychologist with Dr. Connor. I underwent a battery of psychological testing and was interviewed on several occasions by Dr. Chris. Dr. Chris was very professional and his fees were what I believe to be very acceptable. Dr. Chris issued an evaluation opining I was not a danger and could have unsupervised visitation with my daughters.) Snelson claims to have performed a psychiatric evaluation of me as requested by the Court. He also alleges he conducted an extensive review or the court records from my criminal trial in October 2011. In all, he wrote 237 words; the last 16 being “I you have further questions, please feel free to contact me at the above listed number.” The fee for this 237 word “psychiatric evaluation”: $3,692. And who did Dr. Snelson address this letter to? Judge James D. Humphrey.
Before the few detractors start crying about me not agreeing with professionals who do not side with me, take a close look at Dr. Snelson’s 237 word letter/report. There is no recommendation. The first thing to note is he addressed the letter to Judge James D. Humphrey who hasn’t presided over my case since June 2009. Snelson would have known this if he would have actually reviewed any records. Snelson referred me to a psychologist for an extensive evaluation (which cost $3,700) yet never mentions reviewing the evaluation; just phone consultations with Dr. Chris. Snelson wrote “[Supervised visitation] was agreeable to Mr. Brewington as his stated goal was ‘my job is to prove I'm not going to become a danger and get visitation of my girls’!” Read that sentence aloud, then read it aloud again. My high school English teacher Mrs. Z (to whom I am eternally grateful!), would crucify me for that type of sentence structure. I couldn’t even imagine what she would have done if she paid me $3,692 to write something so ridiculous. Snelson then states he did not have the opportunity to meet with me or my daughters after my release from prison. Interviewing the children was not part of the order and why would he need further interviews with me when the evaluation of the psychologist Snelson referred me to states I was not a danger to the children. So Snelson writes a letter addressed to Judge Humphrey with no professional recommendations and ends the letter with “I you have further questions, please feel free to contact me at the above listed number.” To put some perspective on how alarming this is, imagine what would happen if an expert ballistics witness in the trial of George Zimmerman just told the judge in the case to give him a call if he had any questions.
Before going any further, I do want to clarify that Snelson’s evaluation did not actually cost $3,692. The price tag was actually $2,692. The extra grand came when Snelson scheduled an appointment to meet with me at the prison without notifying my lawyer or me. When he finally told my lawyer about scheduled appointment, my lawyer told Snelson I was not ready to meet with him. Snelson charged $1,000 to cancel because it was past the allotted time frame to cancel appointments. Snelson set up an appointment to see me, failed to tell my lawyer or me about the appointment until the day before, and then charged $1,000 because Snelson wasn’t given advanced notice of the cancellation. (I wasn’t made aware of this until recently. I would not have gone through any evaluation with someone exhibiting questionable ethics at the onset of the evaluation process.) After already paying roughly $7,400 for the evaluation process, Snelson tries to extort more money by trying to schedule more evaluations with me and my daughters before he could determine if I was safe enough to pay another mental health professional to supervise visitation per the current court order. When my lawyer questioned the additional sessions and informed Snelson the order did not include an evaluation of my children, Snelson wrote a letter to a judge who hasn’t presided over my case in nearly 4 years.
This is why I write. This is why Joe Sorge made the documentary Divorce Corp. How often does professional misconduct on the part of mental health professionals in custody proceedings occur when it’s happened to me twice? To any detractors I ask, how is this my fault? Sure I could have gone through more evaluations. I’m sure someone could have dragged my kids from Cincinnati, Ohio to Indianapolis, Indiana for evaluations. That would have cost another $8,000-$10,000. Then I would have to pay another few thousand to cover the costs of a mental health professional to supervise visitation. So in order to determine I am not a potential danger to my children and capable of unsupervised parenting time, (as always I like to remind people that there were never any reports of abuse, neglect, etc., and Dr. Connor recommended liberal parenting time in his testimony during my divorce) Dr. Snelson believes I should have to spend somewhere in the range of $20,000 to become an “unrestricted” parent once again. (Please note the $20,000 estimate could soar if my ex-wife forces me to subpoena all of these professionals to appear in court to prove I am not going to be a potential danger to anyone.) Rulings in family courts, like Judge Humphrey’s, turn parents into chum that are thrown in shark infested waters. All the mental health professionals have to do is state they want to be super-duper sure the children are safe and the sky is the limit. (Once again I want to reiterate the professionalism of “Dr. Chris” and his fair billing and am in no way lumping him in with unscrupulous individuals like Dr. Connor and Dr. Snelson.) Judge Humphrey took away my children because I criticized Dr. Connor on the internet. Humphrey testified to this in my criminal trial. I went to prison for 2.5 years because I criticized Humphrey. Now I am criticizing Dr. D. Mark Snelson M.D. for his conduct. Hopefully, the right people will begin to listen.
Thursday, February 13, 2014
|Dearborn Circuit Judge|
James D. Humphrey
“I think you better consider what you're doing because I may consider this as reflecting on what's really important to you, making these web-site postings or your children.” –Testimony of Dearborn Circuit Judge James D. Humphrey during criminal trial of Dan Brewington. This is the ultimatum/warning Judge James D. Humphrey claimed to have given Dan Brewington before stripping Brewington of his ability to see his children. Unfortunately, Brewington’s divorce record is void of Humphrey giving Dan any such ultimatum.
On April 29, 2009 Judge James D. Humphrey held a hearing on a petition for a protective/restraining order filed on 4/16/2009 by the attorney of Dan Brewington’s ex-wife. Brewington’s ex-wife complained about Dan sharing his experiences on the internet in dealing with lawyers, judges, and psychologist through the course of the divorce was bad for her and the children. Brewington filed a Response to her petition and argued the writings were not harmful to the children and their mother and the content was protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. On May 14, 2009 Humphrey’s order on the petition for protective order stated “said Motion should be and hereby is DENIED at this time.”
When a Judge rules in favor of a litigant, one would think the law falls on the side of the litigant. Humphrey also added the following to the order denying the protective order:
“The Court may consider issuance of an Order regarding public distribution of matters involving the Dissolution or Custody Evaluation as part of the Court's Decree of Dissolution in considering the best interests of the children. The Court may also consider evidence presented at this hearing regarding the temporary restraining order in regard to the Court's decision as to visitation and custody and how Respondent's actions may affect the best interests of the children now and in the future.”
Judge Humphrey stated the motion should be and was denied, and then went on to write how he “may” consider an issuance of a different order regarding public distribution of the divorce case at another time. He also said he “may” take into consideration Brewington’s actions in determining visitation and custody. What actions? The actions Brewington took to demonstrate his writings were not harmful to the children or his ex-wife were what caused Humphrey to deny her petition asking Humphrey to force Dan to take down his internet content. What Brewington did not know at the time was Humphrey was giving Dan an ultimatum; stop writing telling people what goes on within the family court system in Southeastern Indiana or I will take your children away from you. Humphrey had the power to order Brewington to remove the internet content if it was dangerous to his children. Humphrey refused to do so because the web writings were not damaging to the children; they were damaging to him.
During cross-examination of Humphrey in Brewington’s criminal trial, Brewington’s public defender, Bryan Barrett, asked Humphrey for his recollection as to why he denied the petition for a protective order. Humphrey had a different and more specific explanation as to why he denied the protective order. Judge Humphrey stated:
“The reason that I denied it because, I think there were probably two reasons: #1, your client was indicating this was my first amendment right to say what I want to say and I was going to let him do it and the second reason was and in my order I also indicated I think to paraphrase, I think you better consider what you're doing because I may consider this as reflecting on what's really important to you, making these web-site postings or your children and I think by your client's continued actions, he made it very clear he was more interested in his web-site postings than his children.”
James Humphrey may be a vindictive and evil judge be he is not a dumb judge. Humphrey was well aware of the fact that he could have ordered Brewington to remove his internet content if the information was damaging to Dan’s children. Humphrey also knew he could have issued an order protecting aspects of the divorce from public dissemination. Humphrey did not issue a protective order because there was no evidence Brewington’s writings were dangerous to the children or harassing to their mother. Judge Humphrey’s testimony states the intention of his order was to tell Brewington to choose between his children or his First Amendment protected criticisms of the court system. Humphrey knew he couldn’t give Brewington that kind of direct ultimatum in a court order because it would have been a very appealable issue and would have likely brought some media attention. Humphrey knew the content was not dangerous to the children because the content is still on the internet to this day. It was Humphrey’s own contention that he sent Brewington a hidden message saying “stop writing or you won’t see your children.” No evidence was ever presented that Brewington’s writings were damaging to his children. Humphrey’s own contention is he felt Brewington should have heeded Humphrey’s warning that was hidden in the order. Humphrey claimed Brewington chose his writings over his children yet Humphrey did not make it clear to Brewington that Humphrey even posed the ultimatum. Brewington would have been better suited to choose one freedom over another if Humphrey would have made it clear to Brewington that he was not going to allow Dan to have both his free speech and his children.
The irony of the situation is, during Brewington’s criminal trial, Humphrey testified his May 14, 2009 order contained hidden threats to take away Brewington’s children if Brewington did not cease exercising his First Amendment Right to criticize the family court system. Brewington was convicted of D Felony Intimidation because Prosecutor Negangard successfully argued Brewington’s writings about Judge Humphrey’s termination of Dan’s parenting time were considered hidden threats and were made in retaliation for a prior lawful act; Humphrey’s terminating Dan’s parenting time. Because Brewington wrote about how Humphrey retaliated against him in taking away his children because Brewington did not cease to exercise his First Amendment Right in criticizing the courts, Dan was prosecuted for retaliating against Judge James D. Humphrey. The scary part to the story is if the Indiana Supreme Court upholds Brewington’s conviction, all someone like Judge Humphrey has to do go to the local prosecutor and cry about how a blog post like this scares him and claim he’s intimidated and the writer can be prosecuted. Only in Indiana.
Tuesday, February 11, 2014
Judge Humphrey testified that Counsel for the Indiana Supreme Court advised him not to follow the Code of Judicial Conduct
Dearborn County Prosecutor F. Aaron Negangard initiated an investigation of Dan Brewington’s writings on August 24, 2009. At that time Judge James D. Humphrey still presided over custody matters concerning Brewington’s divorce decree, where Judge Humphrey terminated all of Dan’s parenting time until Dan received a mental health evaluation to determine whether he posed a possible danger to the children, ex-wife, or Dan himself. It was also during that time when Judge Humphrey claimed he had a handgun repaired, contacted his children’s schools (one being Hanover College), contacted a number of law enforcement agencies, purchased a home security system, received police escorts for he and his wife, and had his home monitored by the local police department; all due do the fear of harm from Dan Brewington. Although not argued during trial, Prosecutor Negangard publicly stated that Dan Brewington threatened to commit arson against Judge Humphrey prior to Humphrey ruling on Brewington’s divorce decree. During Dan Brewington’s trial Humphrey testified he sought the advice of Adrienne Meiring, Counsel for Judicial Qualifications Commission for the Indiana Supreme Court. Humphrey explained Meiring was there “to help give advice to judges regarding ethical issues.” Humphrey contacted Meiring to determine if he should continue to preside over Brewington’s case even though Humphrey claimed to fear for the lives of his family and while actively participating in Negangard’s secret investigation of Brewington’s alleged threats against Humphrey. Humphrey testified that after discussing the matter with Adrienne Meiring, “[O]ur decision was to remain on the case because if I recuse myself some other judge would be put on the case and have to deal with the same thing.” (Trial Transcripts, pg. 254) When asked by Prosecutor Negangard if he had waited to recuse himself at the appropriate time, Humphrey replied “I did.” Judge Humphrey’s interpretation of “appropriate time” consisted of 10 months of continuing to preside over Brewington’s case, obstructing Dan’s ability to be heard in Humphrey’s court and obtain an evaluation, while recusing himself just a week before the June 14, 2010 hearing on the appointment of a psychiatrist to evaluate Dan.
The Indiana Judicial Canons or Code of Judicial Conduct are rules and guidelines Indiana Judges are supposed to follow. We know this because Judge Humphrey and Negangard discuss the topic on page 324 of the grand jury transcripts:
NEGANGARD: And uh, the manner, if you could for the jury, tell them, if a judge, is there canons that judges are supposed to follow?
HUMPHREY: There is.
NEGANGARD: And what are those called?
HUMPHREY: The code of judicial conduct.
The key word in Negangard’s question appears to be “supposed.” Rule 2.11 of the Indiana Judicial Code of Conduct reads as follows:
RULE 2.11 Disqualification (A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality* might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances: (1) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.
The Commentary section of Canon 2.11 states:
 Under this Rule, a judge is disqualified whenever the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, regardless of whether any of the specific provisions of paragraphs (A)(1) through (6) apply. In many jurisdictions, the term “recusal” is used interchangeably with the term “disqualification.”
 A judge's obligation not to hear or decide matters in which disqualification is required applies regardless of whether a motion to disqualify is filed.
Judge Humphrey and Adrienne Meiring, Counsel to the Indiana Supreme Court, came to the conclusion that taking several preventative measures to prevent Judge Humphrey’s family from being injured or dying at the hands of Dan Brewington did not qualify as a personal bias that “might reasonably” question Judge Humphrey’s ability to remain impartial in continuing to preside over Dan Brewington’s custody proceedings. Even if Humphrey and Meiring believed Humphrey could remain impartial, despite the fact Humphrey claimed he was actively working to prevent Brewington from abducting and/or murdering his family, Humphrey and Meiring ignored another key component listed in Comment  of Canon 2.11:
 A judge should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no basis for disqualification.
So even if Judge James D. Humphrey and Adrienne Meiring believed Humphrey could remain impartial despite Humphrey’s “fears” of Dan Brewington, the Indiana Judicial Code of Conduct states Judge Humphrey had a duty to disclose to Brewington on the record that Brewington caused him to fear for his life. But in revisiting Judge Humphrey’s recollection of his and Adrienne Meiring’s decision, the advice of Counsel for the Indiana Supreme Court wasn’t about protecting the rights of the Dan Brewington’s children to be able to get back with their father in an unbiased Indiana Court; Humphrey testified their decision for Humphrey to remain on the case was to protect other judges from having to deal with Brewington for the time span of ten months; the time Judge Humphrey testified was appropriate for recusal. (Trial Transcripts pg. 254.)
People should hope Judge James D. Humphrey was being less than truthful in his testimony during the trial of Dan Brewington regarding his discussions with Adrienne Meiring because it would be horrific to think the advising counsel for the Indiana Supreme Court would advise a judge to involve himself in a conspiracy to obstruct justice in a civil case in order to protect other judges from a civil litigant. Much worse than that is the notion Judge Humphrey would remain on Brewington’s case in an effort not to disturb Negangard’s efforts in prosecuting Dan Brewington on behalf of Judge Humphrey. This is how the Office of Judicial Qualifications of the Indiana Supreme Court advises judges in the State of Indiana; at least according to Judge Humphrey. So by his own accounts, the decision of Judge James D. Humphrey and Adrienne Meiring was to deny Dan Brewington the ability to be reunited with his children in any timely fashion, which is abusive to Dan’s children. In October 2009 , Judge Humphrey told Brewington he didn’t have jurisdiction to hear matters in Dan’s case while Dan was appealing Humphrey’s decision, which was blatantly false. When Brewington retained a lawyer in March 2010, Humphrey suddenly recalled he did have jurisdiction to hear matters and set a hearing for June 14, 2010 on the approval of a psychiatrist to evaluate Dan. On June 9, 2010, just five days prior to the hearing, the orders were filed in Judge Humphrey’s recusal from the case; the “appropriate” time for Humphrey to withdraw as decided by Humphrey and Adrienne Meiring, Counsel for Judicial Qualifications of the Indiana Supreme Court. Humphrey and Meiring’s decision Humphrey remaining on Brewington’s case made it impossible for Dan to have an evaluator appointed until January 24, 2011. Brewington was arrested soon after the appointment and unable to be evaluated until after his release from prison on September 5, 2013. Ironically, during the grand jury proceedings and criminal trial Dearborn County Prosecutor F. Aaron Negangard and Dearborn County Sheriff Michael Kreinhop kept rehashing the point that Dan Brewington never went through with an evaluation in an effort to be reunited with his children; all the while knowing that Judge James D. Humphrey, upon the advice of Adrienne Meiring, continued to remain on Brewington’s case and obstruct Dan’s ability to seek an evaluation. When pressed about the topic of whether Brewington sought the approval of an evaluator during the course of Humphrey’s involvement in the case, Humphrey and Brewington’s public defender Bryan Barrett had the following exchange (Trial Transcripts pg. 261-262):
MR. BARRETT: The prosecutor asked you about whether or not Mr. Brewington ever sought approval for a mental health evaluator pursuant to your order in the final decree. Do you recall that?
JUDGE HUMPHREY: I do.
MR. BARRETT: And did he ask the court to set a hearing on that or did he submit a name?
JUDGE HUMPHREY: It seems to me that toward the end of me being on the case that something about that may have come up and I think one of the issues that had to be dealt with was whether or not I had any jurisdiction at that time to do anything because again once the record is submitted to the Court of Appeals, I'm not sure that the trial Court retained any jurisdiction at that time. And if I remember correctly counsel, I think I issued an order and said exactly that I'm not sure we have any jurisdiction to do anything with it but if counsel has any legal authority to indicate that I could that I would consider.
MR. BARRETT: Okay.
JUDGE HUMPHREY: I think that's how I responded to it.
The irony of the situation is throughout the course of the trial, the prosecution touted the accolades, experience, and respectability of the Honorable Judge James D. Humphrey, but when it came testifying about a subject that might be beneficial to Brewington, Humphrey’s memory and esteemed professional qualities somehow faded. [See 10/24/2011 News Release from Indiana State Bar Association re: Humphrey receiving Outstanding Judge Award. Article claims Humphrey goes “out of his way to check on the progress” of young attorneys and “recommends useful texts and even keeps copies available for loan,” and “makes himself available for practice tips when appropriate.” Humphrey received this praise for providing young lawyers with advice and educational material, yet Humphrey claimed he did not know simple appellate procedure giving him the jurisdiction to allow Dan Brewington to comply with the demands of Humphrey’s own order so that Brewington could be reunited with his children.] Not only did Humphrey claim he did not know the rules of procedure pertaining to a trial court’s jurisdiction of a case while on appeal, but he failed to remember setting the hearing on the approval of Brewington’s mental health evaluator. Even more, Humphrey failed to recall the purpose of the hearing he scheduled and vacated as well. [If Judge Humphrey truly believed that appealing the divorce decree stripped his trial court of jurisdiction of enforcing his own ruling, then Judge Humphrey terminated Dan Brewington’s parenting time knowing that if Brewington appealed the decision, it would be well over a year before Brewington could even begin to fulfill Humphrey’s requirements necessary for Dan to be reunited with his daughters. In his order filed 10/13/2009, Humphrey informed Brewington he needed to seek permission from the Appellate Court for Judge Humphrey to be able to enforce the orders of his court. In an order filed 10/23/2009, denying a contempt petition filed by Brewington’s ex-wife, Humphrey stated that Brewington’s ex-wife did not have to seek permission from the Appellate Court if she could “show authority to [Humphrey’s] Court that it retains jurisdiction to hear this matter pending outcome of the appeal.” When Brewington hired a lawyer to file a motion, filed 3/11/2010, to approve Dr. Henry Waite MD for a psychiatric evaluation, Humphrey granted a hearing. Humphrey, whom claims to have graduated Cum Laude from Indiana University School of Law, either alleges that he was unaware that Appellate Rule 39 gave him jurisdiction to enforce the judgment and orders of his court or Humphrey, who had presided over family court cases since 1998, was simply allowing Brewington’s children to remain fatherless while Humphrey forced non-attorney Brewington to figure out that he just had to tell Judge Humphrey Appellate Rule 39 gave the trial court jurisdiction. Humphrey sent Brewington on a wild goose chase in researching how to inappropriately petition the Appellate Court when all Dan had to do was say, “Appellate Rule 39 gives you the authority, Your Honor.”] If Humphrey would have stated Brewington was actively pursuing an evaluation, it would have shot holes in Prosecutor Negangard’s case and added validity to Brewington’s online criticisms of the Indiana Court System. But by keeping quiet, Humphrey allowed the prosecution to continue to tell the jury that Dan Brewington did not care about his daughters. In his closing statements to the grand jury, Sheriff Kreinhop even went as far to say, “I don't think, of course it's my opinion, but I don't think [Dan] wanted to really be with his children.”
The events described in this blog only emphasize the importance of questioning the judicial system, which is exactly what landed Dan Brewington in prison for 2.5 years. Feel free to contact ethics and disciplinary officials at the Indiana Supreme Court. Please contact Adrienne Meiring, Counsel for Judicial Qualifications of the Indiana Supreme Court, to express any concerns about how the Judicial Qualifications Commission advises judges not to follow the Indiana Judicial Code of Conduct. If it is determined that Adrienne Meiring did not advise Dearborn County Circuit Judge James D. Humphrey to continue presiding over a civil case involving a litigant whom Judge Humphrey claimed might try to murder Humphrey’s own family, then please encourage the State of Indiana to take the appropriate actions against James D. Humphrey for lying under oath in an attempt to bring further harm to Dan Brewington.
Thursday, February 6, 2014
In a seemingly never ending world of unethical and illegal behavior by Dr. Edward J. Connor, of Connor and Associates in Erlanger, Kentucky, this might be his most blatant violation of law or, at the least, easiest to document. During the Dearborn County, Indiana grand jury proceedings involving the investigation of Dan Brewington, spearheaded by Prosecutor F. Aaron Negangard on February 28, 2011, Dr. Connor testified about his “concerns” in allowing Dan Brewington to access the case file from the custody evaluation Dr. Connor performed in Brewington’s divorce. (See DanHelpsKids for examples of Dr. Connor’s prior conflicting statements regarding the case file.) The following testimony of Dr. Edward J. Connor falls on page 82 of the grand jury transcripts:
CONNOR: Well he sent a letter...he wanted his...he wanted the case file and in the line of work that I do, that's not uncommon and I'm okay with an attorney or someone looking at the case file to review something but because of what he was writing, I felt like it was not proper to give him, his ex-wife's medical records and I asked the Court to protect his ex-wife's medical records.
Grand jury proceedings are held in secret and, except in the rarest of cases, never released. In Indiana, releasing information from a grand jury is a B Misdemeanor. (Dan was charged with this offense but was found not guilty because Dearborn County Prosecutor F. Aaron Negangard did not have any evidence demonstrating Dan released any grand jury information, which begs the question how Dan could have been indicted on that particular charge in the first place.) So when Dr. Connor informed the jurors in the confidential grand jury that he contacted the Court, asking the Court to protect the medical records of Dan’s ex-wife, he knew that no one outside of that room would ever know what he said… or at least that was until Prosecutor Negangard sought a perjury conviction against Brewington and requested the release of the grand jury transcripts. The release of the transcripts confirmed what Dan had claimed all along; Dr. Connor is a liar.
Dearborn County Prosecutor F. Aaron Negangard argued in trial that it was against the law for Dan Brewington to make false public statements about Dr. Edward J. Connor, all the while ignoring the fact that he knew Dr. Connor was being less than truthful in his grand jury testimony. (The Indiana Court of Appeals upheld Brewington’s conviction of Intimidation of Judge Humphrey claiming there “was ample evidence from which the jury could have concluded that” Brewington knew his opinions were false. –page 19 Court of Appeals decision filed January 17, 2013) In Brewington’s criminal trial, Prosecutor Negangard, submitted the chronological case summary (CCS) from Brewington’s divorce to demonstrate how many motions Dan filed in his attempts to gain access to Dr. Connor’s elusive case file. Negangard successfully argued that Brewington’s numerous motions appearing on the CCS were a major reason why Dan should be found guilty of D Felony Attempted Obstruction of Justice. (Dan served one year in prison on that conviction.) Prosecutor Negangard also argued Brewington was paranoid because Dan thought Dr. Connor and others were conspiring against him to obstruct Dan’s access to the case file. Negangard successfully argued that Dan “lied” about Dr. Connor’s conduct during the divorce proceedings when Dan claimed Connor’s actions were unethical and illegal. Negangard also successfully ignored the fact that Dr. Connor lied to a grand jury on February 28, 2011 in an effort to put Dan Brewington behind bars.
Dr. Connor’s alleged contact with the Court regarding his request to protect the medical records of Brewington’s ex-wife doesn’t appear on the CCS or in any other letter, pleading, or order of the Court. There isn’t even a mention of the alleged request in all of Dan Brewington’s internet writings criticizing Dr. Connor and others involved in the Indiana Court System. Dr. Connor’s statement is just another example of Dr. Connor lying in a legal proceeding and Dearborn County Prosecutor F. Aaron Negangard was well aware of it. Negangard knowingly used perjurious testimony in a plot to retaliate against Dan Brewington and send him to prison while telling a jury that Dan is manipulative and paranoid.
This is exactly why people need to speak out against corrupted officials like Dearborn County Prosecutor F. Aaron Negangard and Dr. Edward J. Connor, of Connor and Associates. Dan Brewington was sent to prison for calling Judge James D. Humphrey and Dr. Connor criminals. This is just another example of unethical and illegal behavior on the part of Dr. Connor that Dan Brewington has been documenting for years. This criticism of Dr. Connor was listed by Judge James D. Humphrey as the main reason why he terminated Dan’s visitation with his daughters, which was one of the main reasons why Brewington called Judge Humphrey a child abuser. He overlooked Dr. Connor’s wrongdoing and punished Dan’s little girls by taking their ability to see their father because Dan continued to talk about it. In Dan's divorce decree Judge Humphrey wrote, “The Court is most concerned about Husband's irrational behavior and attacks on Dr. Connor.” If Dr. Connor’s alleged request for the protection of the medical records of Brewington’s ex-wife did happen, and occurred behind closed doors, then it would be considered unethical ex-parte communication and Brewington may be entitled to seek relief from his divorce decree. It would also call into question which judge participated in this alleged unethical dialogue with Dr. Connor; the first judge in Dan’s divorce, Carl H. Taul or Judge James D. Humphrey. Either way Dan Brewington should be reunited with his children because reporting illegal conduct of family court officials is not indicative of a parent’s ability to love and care for his/her children.
Wednesday, January 29, 2014
Many people visit this blog understanding that Dan Brewington was sent to prison for his web writings, but often raise the question, "What is the other side of the story?" This is a common question asked by individuals who think there is no way someone in the United States could be convicted for simply speaking their mind and challenging the court system. The following may provide some insight into the motivation for the prosecution of Dan Brewington. Here is the Target Notification Dan received from Dearborn County, Indiana Prosecutor F. Aaron Negangard, dated February 15, 2011, stating Dan was a target of a grand jury investigation concerning allegations of "Intimidation and Harassment that allegedly occurred in 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 in Dearborn County, Indiana." Testimony from the grand jury transcripts document Dr. Edward J. Connor and Judge James D. Humphrey claiming they were afraid Dan might abduct or murder their family as early as 2008 and 2009. An investigation was started in August 2009 after Dan's ex-wife's divorce attorney, Angela G. Loechel, went to Prosecutor Negangard with her own concerns about the safety of Judge Humphrey. (Note: This was after Judge James D. Humphrey took away Dan's parenting time and ruled in favor of her client on every single measure except for a stained glass window, which was part of the house.) Prosecutor Negangard, who also serves as the head of the federally funded Dearborn County Special Crimes Unit, initiated an investigation of Dan Brewington's web writings. It is important to make clear that all of the alleged victims claimed they did not make initial contact with Prosecutor Negangard or Dearborn County law enforcement, despite later testifying that they feared for the lives of their families. With all of the claims of Connor and Humphrey's fear from Dan's "intimidation" and "harassment," despite making no reports to Dearborn County law enforcement, Prosecutor Negangard waited until February 15, 2011 to initiate a grand jury investigation of the actions of Dan Brewington. Many ask why Prosecutor Negangard would wait so long to convene a grand jury against Dan Brewington and what act(s) prompted him to do so. This is a letter from, then, Indiana Supreme Court Chief Justice Randall T Shepard stating Dan's complaint against Dearborn Prosecutor F. Aaron Negangard was dismissed, 239 days after Brewington filed the complaint. Dan's complaint against Negangard was dismissed on Thursday February 10, 2011. By the following Tuesday, Negangard made Dan a target of a grand jury investigation.
If these people were truly fearful, they would have reported it to the police and/or Prosecutor Negangard. (Actually Dr. Edward J. Connor did testify he contacted the Erlanger, Kentucky police and the FBI. They told Dr. Connor to ignore Dan. If there was a crime, they would have investigated it.) During Dan's arraignment on March 11, 2011, the prosecution offered restraining orders to "protect" the alleged victims from Dan. If Dan was truly a danger or committed a crime, Negangard allowed a dangerous criminal to run free while he waited for a ruling on the complaint Dan filed against the prosecutor. This should help shed light on the fact that this is nothing less than an horrific case of prosecutorial misconduct. This isn't a case where a prosecutor convicted an innocent person of a crime they did not commit; this is Dearborn County Prosecutor F. Aaron Negangard making up a crime in an effort to convict a man in retaliation for speaking out against the government.
If you find this to be unbelievable infringement of constitutional rights, please contact Executive Secretary G. Michael Witte of the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission at the below contact information and encourage them to investigate Dearborn County Prosecutor F. Aaron Negangard. Please note that Mr. Witte is a former judge in Dearborn County, Indiana.
G. Michael Witte
Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission
30 S. Meridian St., Suite 850
Indianapolis, IN 46204