This is what makes Dan Brewington a Dangerous Man

In Brewington v State of Indiana, newly appointed Supreme Court Chief Justice Loretta H. Rush based part of the Court’s decision in upholding my intimidation and attempted obstruction of justice of my divorce convictions on Dr. Edward J. Connor’s findings that I was “potentially dangerous.”  Why did Dr. Connor say I was dangerous?  Because Dr. Connor wrote a letter indicating he had ex parte communication with the first judge in my divorce, Carl H. Taul, and I told people about it.  Chief Justice Rush said my conduct in sharing the information caused the alleged victims in my case to experience rational fear.

In a letter to my wife’s and my attorneys, dated February 25, 2008, Dr. Connor wrote:

Other than Dr. Connor’s own account, there was no record of the alleged conversation.  [NOTE: Dr. Connor claimed Judge Taul was in agreement with charging the parties for correcting errors made by Dr. Connor]  Judge Taul made no attempt to include the parties of the conversation or notify the parties of the supposed communication.  On November 30, 1993, the Indiana Court of Appeals wrote the following in its decision in Garrard v Stone:

“Ind. Judicial Conduct Canon 3(B)(8) provides: A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties, concerning a pending or impending proceeding....”

Judge John Baker went on to write:

“Indeed, ‘[e]x parte communications by their nature suggest partiality.’ Tyson v. State (1993), Ind., 622 N.E.2d 457, 459 (Shepard, C.J., explaining recusal).”  “Because the trial court conversed with Page outside the presence of the parties, we have no knowledge of their exchange or how it affected the trial judge's decision. Even the later testimony of a witness cannot cure the appearance of impropriety created by the trial judge's earlier initiation of an ex parte communication. Regardless of the witness' later testimony, the public cannot be sure that the court is impartial and not privy to information unavailable to the parties. It is the possibility that the trial judge gained knowledge not available to the parties which creates the appearance of impropriety.”

According to the Indiana Court of Appeals and the Judicial Code of Conduct, Judge Taul’s correspondence was unethical, or in the least improper.  I thought posting the information on the internet was a public service.  Dr. Connor said it was an indicator of my psychological disturbance.  In Brewington v State, Justice Loretta H. Rush wrote:

“Moreover, he accused the Doctor and Carl Taul, the original divorce judge, of improper ex parte communications with each other, until Judge Taul eventually recused and appointed Judge Humphrey as special judge. See Ex. 120 (Order Naming Special Judge). Defendant considered his campaign a success as to Judge Taul, referring to the recusal frequently in subsequent blog posts.  Exs. 160, 162, 167, 171, 191, 194. But even though those actions had led the Doctor to the professional opinion that Defendant was ‘potentially dangerous,’ he remained in the case.  The Doctor ultimately opined that Defendant is paranoid, manipulative, ‘manic-like,’ ‘unwilling to accept responsibility for his behavior,’ self-centered, unreceptive to criticism, and ‘has difficulty seeing an issue from another’s perspective’—again, ‘a degree of psychological disturbance that . . . does not lend itself to proper parenting.’”

Despite Dr. Connor recommending I have liberal parenting time, Judge Humphrey terminated all my parenting time indefinitely pending a psychological examination and then proceeded to obstruct my ability to petition the Court for an approved evaluator.  So I kept writing.  Rather than acknowledge I was just writing about unethical conduct on the part of an Indiana judge and a Kentucky psychologist not licensed in the State of Indiana, Justice Rush claimed it was malicious conduct that helped lead to the alleged victims’ reasoning that I may try to abduct or murder their families.  Justice Rush was aware of the ex parte communication because she referred to reviewing at least three different documents I authored; all of which included Dr. Connor’s letter dated February 25, 2008.  Justice Rush turned a blind eye to the unethical conduct of Judge Taul and claimed my writings were a basis for fear.  Justice Rush also said it was an attempt to obstruct justice in my divorce.  It should be noted that Justice Rush served on the Juvenile Justice Improvement Committee with Judge Carl H. Taul and Judge James D. Humphrey for at least six years.  Justice Rush continued to sit on the committee with Taul and Humphrey in 2014; several months after the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in my case on September 12, 2013 and before she issued an opinion on May 1, 2014.  Putting it simply, the newly appointed Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court, Loretta H. Rush, did not find it to be improper to continue to sit on a committee with a colleague/friend who was a “victim” in a criminal case while she was writing the opinion on the criminal case involving the same colleague/friend/victim for the Indiana Supreme Court.  This may explain where Justice Rush received her reports of my alleged violence toward Judge Humphrey despite there never being any such claim anywhere in the trial record.  The day after the Indiana Supreme Court filed their opinion written by Justice Rush, attacking me for telling people Judge Taul and Dr. Connor engaged in unethical communications, Justice Rush was sitting with Judge Taul at the May 2, 2014 meeting as fellow members of the Juvenile Justice Improvement Committee.  And they claim my psychological dysfunction increases with every word I write about them.  Please join me on my #RunAgainstRush this November to help raise awareness of the Constitutional deficiencies of the Indiana Supreme Court.