Brewington's Official Criminal Record but still no Violence as alleged by Chief Justice Loretta H Rush

In the criminal case Brewington v State of Indiana, Indiana Supreme Court Chief Justice Loretta H. Rush made numerous references to the violent history of Dan Brewington in her opinion she authored for the Court.  Rush wrote,

“Defendant had also demonstrated mental disturbance, volatility, violence, and genuine dangerousness directly to both of his victims during his years-long vendetta against them.”  -Page 2 of Brewington v State of Indiana

Justice Rush wrote Brewington demonstrated violence toward Judge James D. Humphrey and psychologist Dr. Edward J. Connor over the course of Brewington’s “years-long vendetta against them.  Any acts of violence against anyone are serious violations of law.  A violent act against a judge by someone who lives in a different state usually constitutes a federal crime.  Following his convictions and prior to sentencing, the Dearborn County Probation Department prepared a Presentence Investigation Report for the Dearborn County Superior Court II.  Page 4 of the Report gives a description of Brewington’s criminal history, which would include any convictions resulting from violent actions against judges.  The Report demonstrates that prior to Brewington’s criminal trial in Dearborn County, Brewington’s criminal record consisted of an OVI conviction in Campbell County, Kentucky in 1995-96.  As there is no mention of violent behavior of Brewington prior to the opinion authored by Rush, one could only look to Rush’s opinion to find examples of violence Brewington demonstrated against Judge Humphrey.  Rush gave the following example of what “reasonable people” in Judge Humphrey’s situation would deem “dangerous”:

“Reasonable people in the Judge’s situation would also view Defendant’s erratic, volatile, and violent courtroom behavior – ‘yell[ing] out things,’ ‘thr[owing] his papers’ and shouting ‘I demand justice in this courtroom,’ and ‘laughing inappropriately,’ Tr. 319-as part of that pattern of escalation.” Page 23 Brewington v State.  [Rush later changed “throwing papers” to slamming “piles of books” despite there being no testimony or evidence that Brewington even had “piles of books” during Brewington’s divorce proceedings.  It is unclear whether Rush confused the facts or made up the books story.]

And that’s about it for any examples of violent behavior against Judge James D. Humphrey given by Justice Loretta Rush as the divorce hearings were the only place Humphrey and Brewington crossed paths.  What Chief Justice Loretta H. Rush found to be a major component to a crime of speech, Judge Humphrey, the "victim" in the case, failed to find to be severe enough to warrant holding Brewington in contempt during a divorce hearing.  Rush gave no examples of Brewington acting out violently in the presence of Dr. Connor.  Rush wrote how Brewington’s actions were so vile, that Judge Humphrey even had to threaten to hold Brewington in contempt of court in Brewington’s divorce hearing, but Humphrey never did.  Rush wrote “reasonable people” in Judge Humphrey’s situation would view Brewington’s actions as violent behavior toward Judge Humphrey and the basis of a criminal intimidation conviction despite the fact Judge Humphrey did not deem the conduct to be worthy of holding Brewington in contempt of Court.

Indiana Supreme Court Chief Justice Loretta H. Rush has effectively left Brewington without the ability to obtain legal counsel, or in the least, find an attorney that can present an effective case to the Supreme Court of the United States of America because of the need to demonstrate that many of Rush’s conclusions are drawn from information that appears nowhere on the record of the case.  Any attorney that would suggest Rush made up the content in her decision would face immediately disciplinary action if admitted to practice in the State of Indiana.  Now Dan Brewington has to defend allegations of violence against the victims, which were never raised during trial.  Brewington never had the chance to defend himself against allegations of violent actions because no one ever alleged Brewington committed any acts of violence prior to Rush’s decision.  Hopefully the United States Supreme Court has a little more respect for the United States Constitution than Chief Justice Loretta Rush and the Indiana Supreme Court.   

Comment on an article praising Chief Justice Loretta Rush

Dave Stafford of the Indiana Lawyer wrote a piece on Loretta Rush and how people around the State of Indiana where singing her praises.  I wrote the following comment questioning why Loretta Rush gets a free pass on ignoring the protections normally guaranteed by the US Constitution:

"I find the media ignoring Rush's participation in Brewington v State to be repulsive. Loretta Rush sat on the Juvenile Justice Improvement committee with one of the victims of the case, while she was writing the opinion for the case. If this was a situation where a judge served on a board of directors of a bank with a victim or litigant in a criminal or civil trial, no one would find it proper for the judge to preside over the case; especially if the judge and the victim served on the board together for at least 6 years. This doesn't even take into account how Justice Rush claimed Brewington had a history of violence toward Judge Humphrey, her fellow committee member of 6+ years. There is no record or mention of violence in the trial record or at the appellate level; only in Rush's opinion. Looking at the situation objectively, how could an individual, with no criminal record, have a "history" of violence against a judge without any arrests or without anyone attempting to obtain a restraining order? If someone committed just one act of violence against a judge it would most likely be a federal case but Brewington was never arrest for violence because Dearborn County Sheriff Michael Kreinhop testified that no violence ever occurred. Worst of all Justice Rush wrote that a defendant may waive their rights to constitutional protections that prohibit unconstitutional prosecutions by inviting the error, by assuming any non-objection to the unconstitutional prosecution was trial strategy and not ineffective assistance of counsel. Rush went through the record of the case and picked out partial statements she believed to be threats and used them to support her written decision. On the surface this appears to be appropriate except if the Supreme Court is the finder of what is considered threatening then, by default, the defendant was deprived his 6th amendment right to know which of his actions brought forth the charges against him. The United States court system doesn’t allow a prosecutor to admit tens or hundreds of thousands of word into a court record so the high courts can establish the existence of any possible threats. If this were true, a prosecutor could indict Stephen King, admit all of his horror novels, and allow a higher court to pour through hundreds of thousands of pages in search of a few statements that the court deems to be threatening and then justify the “threatening” nature of the statements by claiming Stephen King was dangerous because he kept writing about horrific situations; all the while barring King from building a defense against the alleged threats because the threats were not defined until after trial. This is exactly what happened in Brewington; where even the appellate court did not establish Brewington’s statements were threats to safety but rather ruled Brewington’s statements, while possibly true, frightened the alleged “victims,” thus satisfying the Appellate Court’s bar for intimidating statements. This fails to take the common sense factor into account that Brewington was convicted of effectively terrorizing the alleged victims for as long as 3.5 years yet no one attempted to obtain a restraining order and Brewington was never held in contempt of court in his divorce proceedings. If Brewington’s threats were clear and worthy of prosecution then the threats were definitely grounds for seeking protective orders. As for the threat of arson, the word does not appear in the grand jury transcripts nor the trial record and Humphrey never expressed any fear nor did he mention that he believed Brewington’s statement about being a pyromaniac was directed toward Humphrey and his family. I have no idea why Loretta Rush receives a free pass on this but the citizens of Indiana should be wary of their constitutional rights before the gavel of the newly appointed Chief Justice, Loretta H. Rush."

This is what makes Dan Brewington a Dangerous Man

In Brewington v State of Indiana, newly appointed Supreme Court Chief Justice Loretta H. Rush based part of the Court’s decision in upholding my intimidation and attempted obstruction of justice of my divorce convictions on Dr. Edward J. Connor’s findings that I was “potentially dangerous.”  Why did Dr. Connor say I was dangerous?  Because Dr. Connor wrote a letter indicating he had ex parte communication with the first judge in my divorce, Carl H. Taul, and I told people about it.  Chief Justice Rush said my conduct in sharing the information caused the alleged victims in my case to experience rational fear.

In a letter to my wife’s and my attorneys, dated February 25, 2008, Dr. Connor wrote:

Other than Dr. Connor’s own account, there was no record of the alleged conversation.  [NOTE: Dr. Connor claimed Judge Taul was in agreement with charging the parties for correcting errors made by Dr. Connor]  Judge Taul made no attempt to include the parties of the conversation or notify the parties of the supposed communication.  On November 30, 1993, the Indiana Court of Appeals wrote the following in its decision in Garrard v Stone:

“Ind. Judicial Conduct Canon 3(B)(8) provides: A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties, concerning a pending or impending proceeding....”

Judge John Baker went on to write:

“Indeed, ‘[e]x parte communications by their nature suggest partiality.’ Tyson v. State (1993), Ind., 622 N.E.2d 457, 459 (Shepard, C.J., explaining recusal).”  “Because the trial court conversed with Page outside the presence of the parties, we have no knowledge of their exchange or how it affected the trial judge's decision. Even the later testimony of a witness cannot cure the appearance of impropriety created by the trial judge's earlier initiation of an ex parte communication. Regardless of the witness' later testimony, the public cannot be sure that the court is impartial and not privy to information unavailable to the parties. It is the possibility that the trial judge gained knowledge not available to the parties which creates the appearance of impropriety.”

According to the Indiana Court of Appeals and the Judicial Code of Conduct, Judge Taul’s correspondence was unethical, or in the least improper.  I thought posting the information on the internet was a public service.  Dr. Connor said it was an indicator of my psychological disturbance.  In Brewington v State, Justice Loretta H. Rush wrote:

“Moreover, he accused the Doctor and Carl Taul, the original divorce judge, of improper ex parte communications with each other, until Judge Taul eventually recused and appointed Judge Humphrey as special judge. See Ex. 120 (Order Naming Special Judge). Defendant considered his campaign a success as to Judge Taul, referring to the recusal frequently in subsequent blog posts.  Exs. 160, 162, 167, 171, 191, 194. But even though those actions had led the Doctor to the professional opinion that Defendant was ‘potentially dangerous,’ he remained in the case.  The Doctor ultimately opined that Defendant is paranoid, manipulative, ‘manic-like,’ ‘unwilling to accept responsibility for his behavior,’ self-centered, unreceptive to criticism, and ‘has difficulty seeing an issue from another’s perspective’—again, ‘a degree of psychological disturbance that . . . does not lend itself to proper parenting.’”

Despite Dr. Connor recommending I have liberal parenting time, Judge Humphrey terminated all my parenting time indefinitely pending a psychological examination and then proceeded to obstruct my ability to petition the Court for an approved evaluator.  So I kept writing.  Rather than acknowledge I was just writing about unethical conduct on the part of an Indiana judge and a Kentucky psychologist not licensed in the State of Indiana, Justice Rush claimed it was malicious conduct that helped lead to the alleged victims’ reasoning that I may try to abduct or murder their families.  Justice Rush was aware of the ex parte communication because she referred to reviewing at least three different documents I authored; all of which included Dr. Connor’s letter dated February 25, 2008.  Justice Rush turned a blind eye to the unethical conduct of Judge Taul and claimed my writings were a basis for fear.  Justice Rush also said it was an attempt to obstruct justice in my divorce.  It should be noted that Justice Rush served on the Juvenile Justice Improvement Committee with Judge Carl H. Taul and Judge James D. Humphrey for at least six years.  Justice Rush continued to sit on the committee with Taul and Humphrey in 2014; several months after the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in my case on September 12, 2013 and before she issued an opinion on May 1, 2014.  Putting it simply, the newly appointed Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court, Loretta H. Rush, did not find it to be improper to continue to sit on a committee with a colleague/friend who was a “victim” in a criminal case while she was writing the opinion on the criminal case involving the same colleague/friend/victim for the Indiana Supreme Court.  This may explain where Justice Rush received her reports of my alleged violence toward Judge Humphrey despite there never being any such claim anywhere in the trial record.  The day after the Indiana Supreme Court filed their opinion written by Justice Rush, attacking me for telling people Judge Taul and Dr. Connor engaged in unethical communications, Justice Rush was sitting with Judge Taul at the May 2, 2014 meeting as fellow members of the Juvenile Justice Improvement Committee.  And they claim my psychological dysfunction increases with every word I write about them.  Please join me on my #RunAgainstRush this November to help raise awareness of the Constitutional deficiencies of the Indiana Supreme Court. 

Indiana Chief Justice Loretta H. Rush: 6th Amendment does not apply to Dan Brewington

The appointment of Loretta H. Rush to the position of Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court delivers a sharp blow to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  In the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in Brewington v State, filed May 1, 2014, Justice Rush wrote:

“Requesting [jury] instructions on actual malice would have called the State’s attention to the distinction it repeatedly overlooked between threatening the targets’ reputations under Indiana Code section 35-45-2-1(c)(6)–(7) and threatening their safety under subsections (c)(1)–(3).”

Justice Rush acknowledged Dearborn County Prosecutor F. Aaron Negangard and his deputies failed to make the argument that the statements Daniel Brewington made about Dr. Edward J. Connor and Judge James D. Humphrey were threats to personal safety.  Negangard argued Brewington’s speech was false and constituted fighting words, which are words intended to invoke a violent reaction from Judge James D. Humphrey and Dr. Edward J. Connor.  Brewington was essentially convicted of criminal defamation, which was affirmed by the Indiana Court of Appeals.  In the opinion from the Indiana Court of Appeals, filed January 17, 2013. Justice Carr Darden wrote, “Even if the State was required to prove that Brewington knew his internet postings and other communications about Judge Humphrey were false, there is ample evidence of Brewington’s knowledge.[sic]  His public comments went well beyond hyperbole and were capable of being proven true or false.”  When the case was brought before the Indiana Supreme Court, Justice Rush wrote making “false” statements, which Judge Darden acknowledged the prosecution failed to prove were false, were constitutionally protected speech.  Rather than remand the case back to trial because the jury was never informed that Brewington could not be prosecuted for criminal defamation especially without providing proof that Brewington’s statements were false, Justice Rush went through the entire record of the case and decided what she believed to be examples of true threats to physical safety.  Even if Justice Rush’s findings about Brewington's statements were accurate, the fact still remains that it was not until after Brewington’s case reached the Indiana Supreme Court did anyone define what parts of Brewington’s speech constituted true threats to personal safety, leaving Brewington unable to prepare a defense against the alleged threats during trial.  Rush said Prosecutor Negangard made the wrong argument then went on to make an argument for the prosecution based on evidence falling outside the view of the jury, then proceeded to, in effect, affirm her own argument she made for the prosecution.

Brewington was found guilty of Intimidation for making unproven “false” statements.  The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects a defendant’s right to be “informed of the nature and cause of the accusation” of the indictments against him.  Despite acknowledging Brewington was never afforded the opportunity to know which of his statements over the course of 3.5 years constituted true threats to safety, Justice Rush wrote, “under the circumstances of this case, we find neither fundamental error nor ineffective assistance of counsel in allowing Defendant to be convicted under general verdicts that failed to distinguish between protected “criminal defamation” and unprotected “true threats.”  Even after pointing out the constitutional flaws in Rush's decision, the Indiana Supreme Court denied Brewington's Petition for Rehearing without explanation.

And Loretta H. Rush has just been named the Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court.  If the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court can arbitrarily decide which citizen is allowed to enjoy the protections guaranteed to him by the US Constitution, all constitutional rights are in jeopardy in Indiana.  This November, Indiana residents need to vote Chief Justice Loretta H. Rush off the Indiana Supreme Court.

Anti-Constitutionalist Loretta H. Rush Named New Chief Justice of Indiana Supreme Court

Today the Indiana Judicial Nominating Commission convened and interviewed potential candidates for the position of Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court.  After publicly and privately interviewing the candidates, the Commission chose Justice Loretta H. Rush to be the next Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court.  This is the same Justice who wrote a Supreme Court decision stating that a defense attorney can waive a person’s constitutionally protected right to free speech.  Justice Rush also wrote that taking advantage of a prosecution’s weak case or argument, by not raising issues on behalf of the prosecution could waive constitutionally protected rights.  And now Justice Rush sits on top of the Indiana Judicial System. 

Newly appointed Indiana Supreme Court Chief Justice Loretta H. Rush ruled that someone can be convicted for exercising a constitutionally protected freedom if the lawyer of the accused waives the defendant’s right to exercise that protected activity.  Sound odd? It should.  Justice Rush wrote that my public defender’s “strategy” in doing nothing to instruct the jury on the principle that a person cannot be criminally convicted for defamation of character, made “it quite possible that the impermissible criminal-defamation theory formed at least part of the basis for the jury’s guilty verdicts, and the general verdict cannot indicate otherwise.”  Justice Rush acknowledged that it was “quite possible” I may have been convicted of intimidation based on constitutionally protected speech.  Rather than remand the case back to trial to ensure the First Amendment of the United States Constitution was not used as a grounds for a criminal conviction, Justice Rush began rationalizing how it is possible for someone to go to prison for exercising their constitutional rights.  Justice Rush wrote,

“Requesting instructions on actual malice would have called the State’s attention to the distinction it repeatedly overlooked between threatening the targets’ reputations under Indiana Code section 35-45-2-1(c)(6)–(7) and threatening their safety under subsections (c)(1)–(3).”

Rush went on to write the following about what she perceives to be the trial strategy of my public defender Bryan Barrett,

“Indeed, the theme throughout [Barrett’s] closing argument was that his speech was all protected political opinion, with no proof that he intended any of it to be threatening.”

Justice Rush described my public defender’s non-action in properly instructing the jury on the difference between threats to reputation and threats to safety as “strategy” yet referred to the prosecution’s non-action, in its failure to distinguish the difference between threats to reputation and threats to safety, as a repeated oversight.  Rush wrote, “In effect, that approach sought to exploit the prosecutor’s improper reliance on “criminal defamation” to the defense’s advantage.”  Rush somehow determined it was advantageous to me for the prosecution NOT to inform the jury nor the defendant exactly what conduct was considered criminal.  Even more, Rush claimed my rights to free speech were waived because my public defender did not explain to the jury which of my actions were protected by free speech and which were illegal.  Justice Loretta Rush effectively claimed that my public defender waived my rights to free speech because Bryan Barrett did not tell the jury that his client was guilty.  Rush rationalized her decision with the following,

“In effect, that approach sought to exploit the prosecutor’s improper reliance on “criminal defamation” to the defense’s advantage.”

Not only did Justice Loretta H. Rush place the burden on a defendant to do the prosecutor’s job in instructing the defendant and the jury on what actions by the defendant the prosecution believes to be criminal, she rationalized her decision by stating,

“Defendant demonstrated significant sophistication about free-speech principles long before trial in a motion to dismiss these charges, Supp. App. 1–4, and confirmed it by his post-verdict, pre-sentencing blog posts, Sent. Ex. 1 at 2–3.”

First it should be noted that Justice Rush’s above claim is false.  When my public defender, Bryan Barrett, refused to meet with me to discuss my case prior to trial, I filed three different motions on October 3, 2011, an hour before trial, to try to protect my constitutional right to free speech, fair trial, right to an attorney, etc… Despite pleading to the court that Bryan Barrett refused to call me, meet with me, provide me with evidence, discuss my explanation of events related to my case, or even provide an explanation of which of my actions constituted a crime, at no point did the trial court, Indiana Court of Appeals or Indiana Supreme Court ever investigate or even inquire into whether my statements about my public defender were true.  Justice Rush even acknowledged the grand jury indictments were vague and compared my case to the case of Bachellar v. Maryland, where there was no particular act or statement that constituted intimidation.  Rush wrote,

“Like Bachellar, the grand jury’s indictments against Defendant here do not allege any particular act or statement as constituting intimidation, instead alleging generally that his conduct as a whole “between August 1, 2007 and February 27, 2011” (as to the Doctor) and “between August 1, 2009 and February 27, 2011” (as to the Judge) was “intended to place [them] in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act.” App. 22, 24. Nothing on the face of the indictments, then, creates confusion between protected or unprotected acts as the basis for conviction. Instead, like Bachellar, any confusion arises only because of how the case was argued and how the jury was instructed.”

An important component Rush failed to mention was the timeframe of events in the Bachellar case.  Justice Rush claimed our cases were similar because the charges did not allege any particular act of intimidation where the prosecution relied on unspecified acts in a certain period of time.  My non-defined “acts” that allegedly constituted intimidation occurred somewhere between August 1, 2007 and February 27, 2011; a period spanning 3 years, 6 months, and 26 days.  In the Bachellar decision by the United States Supreme Court, Justice Brennan wrote,

“The prosecution arose out of a demonstration protesting the Vietnam War which was staged between 3 and shortly after 5 o'clock on the afternoon of March 2, 1966, in front of a United States Army recruiting station located on a downtown Baltimore Street.”

In Bachellar, the defendant was aware that the alleged crime occurred roughly in a two hour timeframe, on March 2, 1966, and the event occurred in front of an army recruiting station on a downtown Baltimore Street.  In comparing my case to Bachellar, Justice Rush stated that as a defendant, I knew what actions of mine over the course of 3.5 years constituted a crime.  She supported her claim by referencing the motions filed on the day of trial and by my post-verdict and pre-sentencing blog posts, which were written after the trial.  Justice Rush determined my guilt based on evidence never presented to the jury.  With that being said, in Bachellar, Justice Brennen wrote,

“Thus, since petitioners' convictions may have rested on an unconstitutional ground, they must be set aside.”

In my case, Indiana Supreme Court Justice Loretta H. Rush agreed that it was “quite possible” that my convictions rested on an unconstitutional ground yet she upheld my convictions because my public defender did not tell the jury what he felt the prosecutor felt was a violation of law.  Justice Rush claimed that since my public defender went with an “all or nothing strategy,” he waived my constitutional rights because he made the argument that all my statements were protected.  Rush believed my public defender had an obligation to assist the prosecution and tell the jury which of his client’s actions were against the law.

Justice Loretta H. Rush believes United States citizens can have their rights to free speech waived if their attorneys do not represent their clients in the “correct” manner or if the attorneys try to take advantage of deficiencies in the prosecutor’s case against their clients.  This doesn't even take into account how Justice Rush ruled legal gun ownership may be considered as a factor of whether a person is likely to be more dangerous than a non-gun owner. Justice Rush also punished me for exercising my Fifth Amendment right to not testify in my own trial claiming it was part of the trial strategy that waived the same rights that were protected by the United States Supreme Court in the Bachellar case.  Rush wrote,

“His decision not to testify, thus letting the case hinge solely on the sufficiency of the State’s proof, was also consistent with an “all or nothing” defense rather than the actual-malice defense he now says he should have had.”

In the courts of the United States of America, the burden is on the State to prove someone’s guilt.  Justice Rush claimed the prosecution “repeatedly overlooked” the difference between threats to reputation and threats to safety.  Rush claimed the indictments were non-specific. Rush said the prosecutor improperly relied on the “criminal defamation” argument.  By her own account, Justice Rush acknowledges the prosecution’s argument against me was vague and unconstitutional yet I somehow waived my rights to constitutional protections because my attorney did not assist the prosecution in their case against me and because I chose not to testify because I felt the prosecution’s vague, criminal defamation argument failed to meet the burden of proof for a criminal conviction.  Justice Rush explained the public defender’s and my “strategy” based on what she believed was our keen knowledge of First Amendment law, which happened to be approximately 15 pages after she corrected the Indiana Court of Appeals for not understanding the First Amendment when they issued a decision in my case in January 2013.

This November there is a retention election for Justice Loretta H. Rush.  The above is every reason why people should go to the polls and vote to have her removed from her judicial seat.  Either Justice Rush lacks the education and intellectual reasoning to understand and interpret the Constitution of the United States of America or she maliciously violated an oath she swore to uphold.  Speak out, show up, and support the US Constitution this fall.  Vote Rush off the Bench.

For more information, check out my Petition for Rehearing and Motion for Disqualification of Justice Loretta Rush; which were both denied, without explanation, by the Indiana Supreme Court.  Please note there was never any mention of violence on my part anywhere throughout the grand jury process, criminal trial or at the Indiana Court of Appeals. Justice Rush stated I had a history of violence despite there never being any accusations of violent activity.  

Letter to my Ex-Wife

The following is a letter to my ex-wife.  This is the first time I have attempted to contact her in nearly five years.  Hopefully two evaluations and a 40 year history of non-violent behavior is enough to convince her that I am not a danger to my children.

July 20, 2014

Dear Melissa,

It has been nearly 5 years since I have seen or spoken to Mary and Audrey.  Since the time you had me arrested for telecommunication harassment, on September 11, 2009 (which was dismissed and expunged), I have made no attempts to contact you, your family, your friends, boyfriends, husband, employer(s), etc…  There has never been any evidence that I have ever presented any danger to you or the girls other than Judge Humphrey’s findings that were based on my criticisms of Dr. Connor, which were perfectly valid.  I never once challenged Connor’s findings that you should be the custodial parent; I simply challenged his conflicting statements and ethics.  Throughout our 2.5 year divorce, you never attempted to modify the amount of time I had with the girls.  There was never any evidence that the girls feared me or did not want to be with me.  I’ve been placed in a position to prove why I may not be a danger when no one has provided any reasonable evidence to suggest that I am.  Worse yet, the only reasoning the Courts have given on my “potential” dangerousness is Judge Humphrey’s interpretation of Dr. Connor’s custody evaluation, which recommended that I should be able to continue to care for the girls at least three days a week.  I think it is time to stop looking for excuses why to keep me away from the children because they need their father.  As their mother, you have the ability to expedite their ability to have their father in their lives.

For nearly the past 5 years, you have taken every opportunity to fight my path back to the girls.  You had me arrested in Cincinnati, Ohio for telecommunication harassment for trying to contact the girls when there was no order prohibiting me from doing so.  If you would not have fought the appointment of Dr. Henry Waite, I would have been able to present a psychiatric evaluation to the court in early 2010.  Your refusal to accept Dr. Waite as an evaluator and Judge Humphrey’s unethical conduct in continuing to serve as the judge in our case, while participating in a criminal investigation against me, delayed the appointment of an evaluator until January 24, 2011.  You played no small role in the investigation, arrest, and conviction in my criminal case, as you testified against me before both the grand jury and the trial jury.  On September 15, 2009, you told Dearborn County Special Crimes Unit Detective Michael Kreinhop that I made threats of violence to you.  Despite the fact that I had no violent past, you told Detective Kreinhop that you believed I was “capable of committing acts of violence.”  [See attached]  (Of course if you did not make these statements, I would hope you would take the appropriate measures to complete an affidavit in support of the truth.)  Our divorce, which you filed on January 8, 2007, lasted 2.5 years.  We went through a custody evaluation and several court hearings.  You’ve unsuccessfully attempted to hold me in contempt on several occasions.  You had me arrested in Cincinnati, Ohio.  You even filed for a (non-physical) protective order to have my web content removed, which was denied.  It wasn’t until after the custody evaluation, divorce proceedings, and you having me arrested did you accuse me of making threats of violence.  You had me arrested because I left you messages and sent you text asking you to have the girls contact me, yet you failed to take any measures to have me arrested or file for any protective orders after claiming that I made threats of violence against you.

As you may know, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld my intimidation, obstruction, and perjury convictions.  A large part of Justice Rush’s conclusions were based on what she claimed to be my history of violence against the victims and my violent behavior.  The trial record is void of any examples of violence against anyone.  Sheriff Kreinhop testified there were no findings of violence against any public official.  The only mention of violence anywhere in my criminal case were your accusations that I made threats of violence.  I recently filed a Petition for Rehearing because of the obvious mistakes of fact in the ruling of the Indiana Supreme Court.  If that fails, I am going to petition a federal court or the United States Supreme Court. 

I've never blamed you for Judge Humphrey terminating/suspending my parenting time with Mary and Audrey.  You do bear the responsibility associated with you and your attorney’s (Angela Loechel) efforts to fight the appointment of evaluators as well as taking every opportunity to damage my reputation as a good father since the filing of the divorce decree.  As such I am allowing you to decide if the children should have their father in their lives.  I am including a copy of a psychologicalevaluation completed by Dr. Christopher Sullivan.  In the report, he opines there is no reason why I should not be able to exercise unsupervised visitation with the girls.  (Please note that Dr. Sullivan requested information from Dr. Connor in order to make the evaluation as thorough as possible but Connor refused to provide Dr. Sullivan with any information.)  With the current state of my criminal case, I am not going to put myself in a position where I have to defend myself against baseless allegations that I am a danger because I criticized court officials.  I am also not going to sit in a courtroom and listen to your lawyer attack me for being a potential danger.  You know I am not dangerous.  You portray yourself to the court as a victim by requesting the Court to keep your address anonymous as if I would do something to harm you or the children.  The fact is I know where the children are because you invite my mother and her sister to the girls’ events.  You send me things in the mail from the girls.  Just recently you sent me a full update on their schooling, physical development, and other activities in their lives.  On September 6, 2009, I sent you a text message stating, “Are you going to have the girls call me?  If not, just say so and I will stop asking. Please tell the girls that I love them.”  Rather than a simple no, you just ignored me.  The following day I sent a text stating, “Tell the girls that I love them. Send me a text to let me know the girls are ok or I will be calling ur family to see if the children are ok becuz i'm worried.”  Rather than letting a father know his children are okay, you chose to ignore the simple request and then had me arrested for telecommunication harassment.  Now you send me somewhat frequent updates on the girls, which, objectively speaking suggests you do not fear me or you are taunting someone you claim to be violent and dangerous. 

You could not comprehend my life in the past several years.  I’ve gone nearly five years without speaking to the two most precious people in my life.  I spent 2.5 years in prison because your attorney initiated a criminal complaint against me on behalf of Judge Humphrey.  You could have spoken in my favor to the falsity of Dr. Connor’s statements.  You could have just sat idle and have done nothing.  Rather than take a passive stance on the issue or try to help our children’s father, you did nearly everything in your power to portray me as a bad person in an effort to send me to prison.  Your recorded statements in my criminal proceedings are either exaggerated or they conflict with your prior statements that exist in the record of our divorce.  What you failed to do during my criminal trial is testify that I threatened you with violence.  I can only assume you did not make that accusation while testifying in my criminal trial because you would have perjured yourself.  I’ve never threated you nor anyone else with violence or any other illegal activity.  People had to lie to send me to prison.  Even after spending 2.5 years in prison and not seeing Mary and Audrey for nearly five years, I still haven’t resorted to any acts of violence nor will I ever do so.  That’s who I am.  That’s who I will always be.

I am at a crossroads in life.  I am 40 years old and I have to make a decision.  How can I possibly prove that I am not a danger to you or the girls when there was no evidence suggesting that I ever was?  If you believed I was a danger, as a responsible parent you would have attempted to modify my parenting time somewhere along the line of our 2.5 year divorce.  The evaluation performed by Dr. Sullivan should be sufficient to demonstrate I am not a danger.  Dr. Connor’s recommendation of liberal parenting time should be enough as well.  If you are willing to enter into an agreed order where I would get some kind of normal unsupervised parenting time, the girls will be able to once again have their father in their lives.  If the visitation recommendations of Dr. Connor and Dr. Sullivan, my record of non-violence, combined with the fact I have not seen you or attempted to contact you in nearly five years does not convince you that I do not present a danger to anyone, then I am done.  I am not going to spend any more time and money fighting unsubstantiated and false allegations about me being potentially dangerous, especially as you have fought to keep me from obtaining the information in Dr. Connor’s case file that would definitively demonstrate that I was correct in my assertions regarding Dr. Connor’s ethics.

I live with a huge void in my heart.  You can continue to speculate to what you believe are my true intentions in everything I have done but it has always been about my love for Mary and Audrey.  Throughout the course of our 2.5 year divorce, I did not leave the girls with mom so I could go out at night.  I never asked you to take the girls on my days because I wanted to make other plans.  You continued to speculate why I might not be a good father or why I might not love Audrey and Mary rather than acknowledging that I could love them as much as you.  I’m not going to put myself at risk in continuing to argue the inarguable against you in a court system that has actively worked to put me put me in prison for 2.5 years; especially as your attorney has a reputation of successfully initiating secret criminal investigations against me.   Your lawyer made a criminal complaint on behalf of Judge Humphrey’s “welfare” then sat idly by while Judge Humphrey continued to preside over custody matters for nearly a year, delaying my ability to have an evaluator approved.  I’m not going to continue to fight with my hands tied behind my back; especially as I defend myself against a malicious Supreme Court ruling and your unsubstantiated fears as to why I may be capable of committing acts of violence when I have a 40 year record of a non-violent lifestyle.  As I am representing myself, if your attorney believes I make the wrong legal strategy, file too many motions, or if she can use one of my statements out of context, she can make another complaint to the police, where I would be susceptible to further incarceration.  So you can decide if you want me to play a role in the lives of our daughters while they are young.  Regardless of what becomes of this situation, the girls will become adults and I feel confident any lost bond will be reconnected.  Children are afraid of dangerous parents.  Neither of the girls have ever been afraid of me and you nor any other person have ever asserted that they were.  They will someday learn about the nature of the bad acts by Judge Humphrey, Prosecutor Negangard, Dr. Connor and others who put their dad in prison and worked tirelessly to lie in their efforts to do so.  The only question you don’t want the girls to ask is, “why didn’t mommy do anything to help?” 

You do whatever it is you believe to be in the children’s best interest.  I’m no longer putting myself at risk to fight baseless allegations in an unfair system that refuses to provide me with the resources to dispute the allegations.  If you want to continue to argue that I am a dangerous father who you claim is “capable of committing acts of violence,” then I guess I will see the girls when they are adults when I can definitely prove that I did not do anything to harm them or their mother.

Dan Brewington

This is what happens when Dan Brewington gets angry with judges

Hopefully this gives some people a little perspective on who I am. Indiana judges like Judge James D. Humphrey and Supreme Court Justice Loretta Rush have fallen all over themselves to tell the public I am an angry and dangerous individual. This is a snapshot of my Facebook page explaining what happens when I get angry with judges.  This is why Justice Rush and the Indiana Supreme Court  went to such extremes in their efforts to portray me as a bad guy.

https://m.facebook.com/groups/325330308839?view=permalink&id=10153341796138840