Chief Justice Rush alleges Jury Misconduct and Malicious Prosecution

An in-depth analysis of Daniel Brewington v State of Indiana demonstrates how the findings by the Indiana Supreme Court, in an opinion written by now Chief Justice Loretta H. Rush, alleges malicious prosecution as well as misconduct on the part of the jury in my trial.  In the Court’s opinion filed on May 1, 2014, Justice Rush wrote:

“To the extent Defendant attempted to veil his threats behind self-serving disclaimers and supposed ‘hypotheticals,’ the victims saw through that pretext—as did the jury, and as do we.’”

The first thing to note is I never made any specific threat to Judge James D. Humphrey.  [In upholding my conviction of attempted obstruction of justice of my divorce, Justice Rush referred to a blog post of mine where she claimed I made a hidden threat to punch Dr. Edward J. Connor in the face.  The Supreme Court stated this was an attempt to intimidate Dr. Connor in an effort to keep him from testifying in my divorce hearing.  Besides being an obvious non-violent analogy about making a consumer complaint against a plumber vs a custody evaluator, the obvious flaw with this argument is the blog was posted on May 11, 2010; 350 days after Dr. Connor’s testimony I was supposedly trying to obstruct occurred.]  If someone were to feel the need to argue this point, I would direct you to the Statehouse in Indianapolis, Indiana because it was Justice Rush who wrote:

“Since Defendant never stated an overt threat against the Judge, we begin by examining the circumstantial evidence to determine whether Defendant knew his actions would be understood as a threat.”

First it’s important to note that in Indiana, the State does not bear the burden to prove the existence of a real threat in a criminal intimation trial.  The Court’s ruling in my case has whittled First Amendment protections down to the point where a prosecutor may arrest and try someone for intimidation if a prosecutor believes there is evidence a person would understand his public statements about public officials could be understood as a threat by the “victims.”  Obviously any public scrutiny of public officials has the potential to stir angry reactions from the readers of the speech.  It goes without saying that the targets of that speech may experience some element of fear or feel threatened due to that public anger.  However, outlawing speech critical of public officials because of public outrage only serves to shield the officials from criticism and public outrage; a huge component in public accountability.  The freedom to criticize judges is even more critical.  Attorneys are barred from criticizing judges.  Judges enjoy absolute immunity from civil action dealing with anything considered to be within the realm of their judicial capacity.  As the law currently stands in Indiana, in a case dealing with an unhappy litigant’s persistent complaints about a presiding judge, a prosecutor need only demonstrate in court that the speaker had a reasonable understanding that the judge, who was the target of the speech, may have viewed the speech as a threat.  The only other requirement for conviction is to have the judge testify he viewed the speech as a threat. 

Another key point that cannot be contested, per Justice Loretta H. Rush and the other four members of the high court in Indiana, is that I was a victim of an unconstitutional prosecution.  Rush wrote it was “quite possible that the impermissible criminal-defamation theory formed at least part of the basis for the jury’s guilty verdicts and the general verdict cannot indicate otherwise.”  This was due to what Justice Rush referred to as “the prosecutor’s improper reliance on ‘criminal defamation’” during my criminal trial. She also said the prosecution “repeatedly overlooked” the distinction between threats to reputation and threats to safety.  A substantial part if not all of my defense centered around rebutting what the Supreme Court found to be Prosecutor Negangard’s unconstitutional criminal prosecution of speech.   Rush sidestepped the constitutional violation by claiming I somehow invited the errors associated with the malicious prosecution.  The Supreme Court ruled the State did not have to prove a real threat.  The State did not have to make a constitutional argument.  The State did not have to tell the jury or the defendant which of the defendant’s actions constituted a crime, nor provide the jury with constitutionally adequate jury instructions.  Justice Rush claimed my “crime” consisted of knowing the “victims” of my case would interpret my speech as threats and then asserted the jury came to the same conclusion as the Supreme Court as the jury also saw through my “pretext” and found that I tried to disguise my hidden threats.  As Justice Rush found the prosecution’s criminal defamation argument to be unconstitutional, the indictments by the grand jury would fail any constitutional test.

How Justice Rush knew the thoughts of the jurors is a mystery.  Rush’s interpretation of the jury’s findings in my trial differ from the prosecution’s trial arguments.  Rush’s opinion claimed the prosecution’s criminal defamation argument was incorrect, the prosecution failed to make the distinction between legal and illegal conduct, while also stating the general-verdict error made it impossible to determine what factors compelled the jury to return a guilty verdict; yet Justice Loretta H. Rush and the Indiana Supreme Court claimed to somehow know the specific logic behind the jury’s findings.  If you rule out the premise that Loretta Rush and the Indiana Supreme Court would lie about knowing the thoughts behind the jurors’ findings, the only means by which the Indiana Supreme Court could obtain the jury’s thought process in returning a guilty verdict is if the Court physically interviewed the jurors.  Even if Justice Rush and the Indiana Supreme Court employed some kind of supernatural psychic powers in determining the exact logic behind the thoughts of the jurors, the actions of the jurors would constitute jury misconduct as they returned a verdict in my trial that wasn’t consistent with the prosecution’s arguments nor the jury instructions.  By default, the “guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” requirement mandated by the jury instructions fails miserably when the current Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court claims the prosecution pursued a conviction for constitutionally protected activity; an error which is impossible for a defendant to invite.  Yet somehow Justice Loretta Rush claimed, "the failure of the jury instructions and general verdict to distinguish between protected speech and unprotected true threats did not prejudice Defendant’s substantial rights here."

There is little doubt in my mind that Indiana Supreme Court Justice Loretta H. Rush crafted the Court’s opinion in this case to send the following message to me or any other person who may criticize judges in the State of Indiana, “DON’T F*** WITH US!”  This fails to account that Rush used the exercising of my Fifth Amendment Right not to testify and evidence presented AFTER the trial, both of which are or should be out of reach of the jurors, as factors in rationalizing my “guilt” and upholding my conviction.  The Indiana Supreme Court did not take these measures to prove that I was the suspect who committed a crime, they resorted to extreme speculation in an effort to make an argument that a crime against the First Amendment was even committed.  I continue to closely analyze Rush’s opinion to find more constitutional arguments that exist within the discrepancies of Rush’s own statements.  Rush tried to custom tailor an opinion in such a manner to thwart any attempt to appeal to the United States Supreme Court.  Rush’s efforts may have unknowingly narrowed down the complexity of my petition to the High Court of the country.  I’ve already contacted a legal publisher and plan on filing my petition for a writ of certiorari well before the October 29, 2014 deadline.  Stay tuned for more information. 

“It is not, what a lawyer tells me I may do; but what humanity, reason, and justice, tell me I ought to do.”

― Edmund Burke, Speech on Conciliation with America